In May, Moscow completed its displacement of Washinqton in
Ethiopia. The Derque announced in April the closure of the Kaqnew Communications Station and other U.S. facilities. 9 Althouqh this action followed close upon an American decision to reduce the U.S. military advisory qroup and to close the obsolete Kaqnew facility, it was unlikely that Menqistu would have made such a decision without the prospect of increased Soviet arms aid. 1 0 Indeed, the need for Moscow's aid became imperative after the U.S. stopped delivery of nearly 100 million dollars in arms sold to Ethiopia. 1 1 Therefore in May, Menqistu jour--5---hold neyed to Moscow and signed a declaration on the "foundations for friendship and cooperation." 1 2 No doubt in deference to the Somalis, the Kremlin confined its "contractual" relationship with Ethiopia to a declaration, a level lower than the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Priendship and Cooperation. In addition to technical and economic agreements, the Soviets agreed to a major arms package with the Ethiopians worth 400 million dollars. 1 3 Furthermore, some 50 Cuban military advisers arrived in Ethiopia in May. 1 4 The Somalis were unwilling to pass up the historic opportunity to incorporate the Ogaden into a qreater Somalia.
Many Somali leaders were no longer impressed by Soviet appeals to be "patient." Expressing their view, Siad Barre asked rhetorically:
But who can guarantee us that once his regime is consolidated and his army strengthened [by the Soviets], Menqistu will consent to negotiate the territorial conflict between us so as to find a solution that complies with the wishes of the Somali people in the Oqaden?" 1 5 To reduce his army's dependence on the Soviets for arms, spare parts, and POL, Siad Barre exercised his Arab option. So Somalia expanded its search for support beyond the radical Soviet-oriented states like Iraq and Syria to the more conservative Mideast countries and through them, -6-the United States. Saudi Arabia renewed its lonq-standinq offer to qive Moqadiscio 300 million dollars to expel the Soviets. 1 6 Symbolizinq his effort to aliqn himself more closely with moderate Arab states in the reqion, Siad Barre travelled to Taiz, North Yemen, where he attended a meetinq sponsored by the Saudis with representatives of the Sudan and North and South Yemen. 1 7 The purpose of this March meetinq was to discuss Red Sea security or what the Soviets called an "Arab lake" scheme desiqned to exclude Moscow and Tel Aviv from the Red Sea.
In addition, the Somalis souqht weapons from the West.
The United States was aqreeable because it viewed Somali disenchantment with the Soviets as an opportunity to restore a semblance of a balance of power in the Horn. 1 8 It would also please moderate Mideast states in the reqion.
In July, the United States alonq with France and Britain aqreed to supply the Somalis with "defensive arms." 1 9 In that same month, Somali reqular forces joined Somali-supported querrillas* fiqhtinq in the Oqaden.
*Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF).
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THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN WAR
The Soviets apparently did not anticipate the Somali offensive. The Ethiopians later claimed that the Soviets had assured them that they would prevent the Somalis from attacking in force. 2 0 These assurances led the Ethiopians in April to move an artillery and an armored battalion from Gode, a strategically located town near the Somali border with the only good airport in the Oqaden, to fiqht riqhtists in northwestern Ethiopia. 2 1 Once the Somalis did invade, Moscow played for time to They signed a 385 million dollar arms agreement with Ethiopia in September. 2 7 Even before the visit, Soviet weapons shipments to Somalia had experienced intermittent delays and by September, it was clear that Soviet arms deliveries to Mogadiscio had been limited to spare parts and light arms. 2 8 Heavy weapons deliveries had reportedly ceased altogether.
Nevertheless, Moscow maintained its connection with Mogadiscio. Addis Ababa complained of continuing weapons deliveries to Somalia. Mengistu pointedly remarked at a press conference on September 18:
If socialist countries are still supplying arms to Somalia, then this is not only violating one's principles, but also tantamount to complicity with the reactionary Mogadiscio regime. 2 9 In mid-October, Moscow's Ambassador to Ethiopia publicly announced that arms deliveries to Somalia had ceased. The number of Cuban military advisers in -9-Ethiopia increased from 150 to 400 durinq the followinq two weeks. 3 2 Even so, Soviet military advisers, who had little to do while Somali forces were rampaqinq in the Oqaden, remained in Somalia.
By November, the Somali offensive had boqqed down. The initial thrust had yielded larqe qains, which culminated in the capture of Jijiqa in mid-September. 3 3 But Ethiopian resistance had hardened around Harar and Diredawa, the other major towns in the Oqaden. Previously, the Soviets had indicated their sympathies for Ethiopia by emphasizing respect for the principle of territorial integrity as the basis for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. 3 8 On November 13, there were still 1,678 Soviet advisers in Somalia, representing implicitly the Kremlin's interest in the country. 3 9 After the expulsion, Vasiley I. Petrov, Deputy
Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, arrived to direct the war aqainst the Somalis. Africa. 4 5 The U.S. suspended the Naval Arms Limitations Talks (NALT) on the Indian Ocean. Concern was also expressed that the Soviets might support a Cuban or Ethiopian invasion of Somalia. 4 6 However, Moscow and Addis
Ababa offered assurances that they would respect the OAU's doctrine on territorial inteqrity. 4 7 The Africa. 4 9 In addition, Ethiopia itself must have attract- Sea coastline) could be forestalled.
To reconcile these "pulls and pushes" in their policy, the Soviets advocated a federation scheme for the reqion. and the "efforts of certain states to improve their control on the Red Sea at the expense of the legitimate riqhts of other states and peoples of this reqion." 5 8 Yet, the Soviets were not insensitive to Somali feelings.
As we have seen, the Soviets and Ethiopians signed only a declaration not a treaty of "friendship and cooperation."
The Soviets were apparently hopeful that the Somalis would join the Red Sea "area's progressive forces" in coordinatinq "their strugqle aqainst the intriques of the common enemy --imperialism."
*At the time of the meeting, the Soviets even altered their proposals for a Middle East peace settlement to include a provision recognizing the right of all ships, includinq Israeli ones, to free passage through the reqion's waterways. ' 7 This suqqests that Moscow took the meetinq very seriously.
-20 - We will teach [the Somalis] a lesson they will not forqet. We will bring them to their knees. 6 3 In doinq so, the Soviets could demonstrate their capacity ] to protect their interests in Africa and the Mideast.
Modality
In regard to the question: Is Soviet "crisis policy" activist or cautious? It can be argued that Soviet policy in the Horn was both activist and cautious.
It was activist in the sense that the Soviets displayed a marked willinqness to exploit available opportunities to *Although the Somalis, by this time, had lost their revolutionary democratic allure, the Soviets had attempted throughout to maintain their position in Somalia to preserve their military facilities in the country and their access to Berbera which was a valuable counter in the NALT neqotiations. Soviet ships and Soviet-supplied planes helped deliver the Cubans to Ethiopia. 6 4 Soviet pilots were assigned to Cuba releasing their Cuban counterparts for action in Ethiopia. 6 5 Even the maps the Cubans proudly published in Granma detailing the Cuban-Ethiopian victory bore Russian transliterations of Ethiopian place names. 6 6 In addition, the Soviets proved willing to tackle the problems and difficulties associated with mounting a large-scale air-and sealift to Ethiopia. We believe it is fundamental that there be a recognition and a respect by all parties of internationally recognized borders .... We will continue our present course of action with respect to not supplying arms to either side but if there were a crossing of borders, it would present a different situation and we would have to consider it then.
7 0
Egyptian President Sadat told two American Congressmen in December 1977 that Egypt and Sudan would each send an armored brigade to Somalia if events warranted such action. 7 1 In January 1978, both Iran and Saudi Arabia warned they would not stand idle if Somalia were invaded. Even in the fighting, the Soviet Union supported the Ethiopian government's statement that it had no intention of crossing its borders, but only aimed to rebuff attacks and liberate its own territory.
The USSR and other countries interested in a peaceful settlement managed to keep the war from spreading from all parts of the Horn of Africa, and lithin a comparatively short time the war was stopped.4 Despite Moscow's willingness to be extremely active in the conflict, the Soviets clearly recognized the limits of acceptable involvement in the Ogaden War.
Performance
Certain questions have been raised about Soviet crisis performance:
How well have the Soviets done during crises in light of their policy objectives? Do the Soviets "manage" crises deftly or do they just muddle through them?
In terms of Soviet policy objectives vis-a-vis Africa and the Mideast, one could argue that the Soviets managed the crisis in the Horn rather well.
*A segment of the Ethiopian military had favored the easier alternative. 7 3 Active Soviet involvement in the war probably helped make certain that it was not chosen.
-True, the Soviets did not achieve their optimal objectives in the Horn nor did their policy fail to incur major costs. The Soviets failed to achieve their most desired result --a federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and the Yemens. Nor were they able to preserve their influence in Somalia.
Yet, if, in the unlikely event, the Somalis should be willinq to seek a negotiated settlement with Ethiopia concerninq the Oqaden, the Soviets could again raise the federation scheme as a potential solution.*
In addition, the Soviets lost access to the valuable naval and air facilities that they had constructed at Berbera and elsewhere in Somalia. Yet, they have offset this loss by obtaining access to Aden and Ethiopia's Dahlac Island.
However, this happy outcome could not have been counted on at the time. Previously, the PDRY had been reluctant to grant the Soviets access to Aden comparable to the access they enjoyed at Berbera.** With Eritrea in rebellion in *Such a possibility is not inconceivable. In January 1979, Siad Barre indicated an interest in improvinq relations with the USSR. Why is the United States stepping from one fiasco to another? In Ethiopia, in Somalia, in Afghanistan, the United States left the field to the Russians without as much as an attempt to stop them. 7 7 In peacetime, the perception of power is almost as important as the reality of power. In that respect, the So-*Indeed, the perception of American weakness became so widespread that an "African leader," a character in a 
